This article studies the standard form contracts used by automobile manufacturers to purchase auto parts. It explores how the contracts reflect divisions of bargaining power, asymmetric information, problems of hold-up and renegotiation, and market competition. Based on interviews with representatives of buyers and suppliers, the article also describes the process of drafting the forms, the negotiation over price and other terms in the shadow of these forms, and the opportunities for non-drafters to extract improved terms. Some of the main lessons are: (i) The terms of the contracts and the bidding process prevent ex-post hold-up by suppliers (in contrast to the claims made by Benjamin Klein and others based on the GM/Fisher Body contract); (ii) There is surprisingly little ad-hoc tailoring of terms, even when such tailoring can increase the surplus from the deal; (iii) Internal organization structures are harnessed effectively to secure favorable bargaining outcomes; (iv) There is a significant variation between the standard forms utilized by the big automakers, in some of the most important aspects of the deals. This variation suggests that some of the terms are inefficient.
BOILERPLATE AND ECONOMIC POWER IN AUTO MANUFACTURING CONTRACTS

Introduction
Manufacturing contracts in the automotive industry have served a canonical role in the economic theory of contract and bargaining. The famous story of General Motors' relationship with its supplier Fisher Body in the 1920s is a landmark illustration of the problem of contractual hold-up, underlying a prominent theory of vertical integration and the nature of the firm.
1 The theoretical fascination with automotive procurement contracts is well deserved. There may be no other merchant-to-merchant contractual template that governs such fantastic economic stakeshundreds of billions of dollars per year-and implemented through a process that involves almost no negotiation of the legal terms. Boilerplate rules these transactions.
There is a long line of law-and-economics scholarship studying the attributes of standard form terms in contracts between sophisticated parties in high-stakes transactions. One of the benchmark predictions in this literature is that contractual terms have to be efficient if they are to be consistently used by the parties. 2 Any rent-seeking power that a party has should be translated into a price advantage; it should not be used to dictate selfish but inefficient performance terms.
Further, since legal terms such as warranties and remedies affect the costs borne by the parties, we expect that sophisticated parties will be "pricing" the terms and will be ready to redraft terms that cost more than they save. A study of automobile contracts provides an opportunity to test these predictions. These are transactions where economic power is unevenly distributed; much dickering takes place over prices and product design; but everything else is packed into boilerplate. Every party reads the boilerplate and understands its legal effect and its economic consequences. Do strong parties dictate efficient boilerplate and extract rents through prices and other purely distributive clauses? Do they tailor their terms to maximize their net gains from the transactions?
Moreover, automotive supply contracts are the paradigmatic long-term relationships that require a great deal of relationship-specific investments in the form of machinery, location of plants and precontractual technology research. As the economic literature predicts, the dependence of suppliers (who must invest in specializing for their buyers' needs) and buyers (who need specialized parts from their suppliers) gives opportunities for hold-up. 3 These dangers make the contracts the primary tool to deter hold-up and to encourage investments. What are the contractual techniques used to address the risk of hold-up?
In answering these questions, we have taken a simple, almost naïve approach. We read and compared the boilerplate contracts in the industry, and talked to lawyers who drafted these forms and to some non-lawyer participants in the industry. We provide a case study, but it yields some general insights. For example, the boilerplate contract terms between the Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) and the tier-1 suppliers show how economic power is translated into transactional advantage. From the contract terms we can identify ways the OEMs extract value from their suppliers. Contrary to the fabled GM/Fisher Body story, we find no real problem of "hold-up" by suppliers. The claim that suppliers with a long-term contract can hold up the OEMs is based on a misunderstanding of the terms of the deal, the rules of contract law,
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boilerplate provisions. It argues that these differences cannot be easily reconciled with the prediction that sophisticated parties draft the most efficient boilerplate terms. Part II examines how these forms are drafted, how their terms are negotiated, and how the OEMs guard their terms from erosion. It provides some insight on how "tailoring" occurs and how the internal organization of a party to a deal affects the terms that this party can secure. Part III focuses on the role of economic power. There, we examine how power is harnessed to administer and modify contracts. This analysis revisits the claims made on the basis of the GM/Fisher Body deal, and argues that some of these claims are not valid. We demonstrate the subtle ways in which hold-up and renegotiation are curtailed. Finally, Part IV examines ways in which a less powerful party can nevertheless get favorable contract terms.
I. The Contracts
Supply contracts in the automotive industry are made through competitive bidding. An OEM issues requests for quotations (RFQs) for a particular part or assembly. The supplier whose bid is picked would ordinarily make a significant capital investment in R&D and production assets, and supply this part for the duration of the car model in which the part is assembled, a period which normally lasts four to eight years. The winning bidder, however, does not always get the security of a long-term, fixed-price contract. While some OEMs accord the supplier a long-term sourcing commitment, the actual purchase orders are issued on a short-term basis.
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Shorter contracts give the parties opportunities to renegotiate aspects of the deal like price and quantity estimates; OEMs commonly demand (and receive) price reductions every year. 
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Patricia Panchak, Supplier Partnerships Provide a Competitive Edge, Indus. Wk., Sept. 2004, at 9. Technically, most of these adjustments are not modifications of the contract, but rather renewals of short-term purchase orders (POs), all entered into under a master long-term agreement.
The contracts we looked at are the boilerplate purchase orders governing the actual supply agreements. While there is some interest in the long-term master agreements, their language is usually brief and subordinates them to the terms of the shorter-duration POs. These forms are drafted by and issue from the OEMs through a process which will be described in Section II. Each OEM has a single form, titled either "Global Terms" or "General Terms," which is used for procuring all of the manufacturing parts, almost without exception. General Motors, for example, enters into roughly one million procurement contracts every year, at a total amount in excess of $80 billion-all governed by a single contract form containing thirty-one paragraphs, 13 translated into six languages. In terms of economic stakes, this form may be the single most important commercial contractual document ever drafted. In the remainder of this section, we compare the standard forms of the North American OEMs.
Before we started this study, our conjecture was that we would find similar boilerplate language throughout this industry. Influenced by the economic theory of standard form contracts, we expected these contracts between ultra-sophisticated parties to include efficient arrangements.
Surely the OEMs have significant bargaining power vis-à-vis their suppliers; but economic theory teaches us that it would be wise to use this power in extracting more favorable bottom line prices, not by extracting inefficient, one-sided legal terms. 14 Moreover, our expectation that the forms would be uniform throughout the industry was influenced by the fact that they are all contracts in sophisticated transactions are efficient. These contracts, recall, are between companies that have large in-house attorney staffs, who read the forms in their entirety, who have lifetime experience in the auto business, and who look to manage huge stakes with these contracts. If these forms vary in important ways, some of them must include terms that are less efficient-that is, terms that cost the weaker party more than they enrich the strong party.
According to all of our interviewees, the most important issues in the OEM boilerplate contracts are the following: termination rights, warranties and remedies, tooling (the ownership of the production assets), intellectual property rights in technological innovations, and service parts. Consider each of these issues.
Termination. In all purchase contracts, OEMs secure the right unilaterally to terminate the agreement. 18 This right to terminate, which is not available to suppliers, is almost unrestricted.
Either for no cause at all, or for reasons stated ambiguously as "competitiveness" of price and quality, the OEMs can, with short notice, terminate the contract. In fact, the cancellation rights are so one-sided that they might render the contracts unenforceable on the ground that they lack consideration or fail to state a quantity term under the statute of frauds. 
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It is interesting to compare the OEM's warranty terms with those appearing in the boilerplate purchase contract in Germany ("VDA"), which applies to all procurement contracts in all tiers. The VDA's warranty and remedies provisions give the supplier a greater role in assessing any damage claim, participating in repairs and replacements, and being consulted before any action is taken by the buyer. The VDA's terms also limit the duration of warranties, reduce their scope when the supplier is not negligent, and allow a host of opportunities to cure. See Service Parts. The arrangements governing service parts can be a source of important profit for suppliers, as well as a significant burden. Service parts are sold in the retail market at a large premium. If the OEM alone may sell these parts, the supplier is deprived of a share of potential profits. Moreover, if the supplier is obligated to supply the OEM's requirements for these parts for years after the model production ends (when it is expected that volume efficiency, materials, and skilled personnel will no longer be available), the burden on the supplier can be large.
Almost all OEMs require the supplier to agree to supply service parts for a period of ten to fifteen years after current-model production ends. Some OEMs, however, share the surplus that this production will yield. Honda and Toyota, 31 for example, stipulate that the service part prices will be negotiated by the parties when the time comes; that translates to a profit-sharing deal. Others (e.g., GM) require prices to remain at their low, production-phase price for an initial period, say three years, 32 after which a higher negotiated price would be agreed upon. Most 
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Similarly, OEMs draft broad indemnity terms, entitling them to reimbursements of legal defense expenses of claims (such as products liability) for which the supplier will ultimately be responsible. Suppliers are nervous about their inability to control or influence the litigation of such claims, and at the same time their responsibility for the outcome of the litigation and its cost. harsh are terms that require suppliers to commit to fifteen years of post-production supply and to refrain from raising prices above the production-phase prices. 33 These provisions were described by a tier-1 supplier as "cyanide pills"-leaving the supplier with the high cost of maintaining a production line but without the ability to recoup this expense through high volume of sales.
The service parts provisions are not only a matter of division of surplus; they also have efficiency implications. When a car model is discontinued by an OEM, the production volume of parts obviously decline substantially. Maintaining the production line and the skilled labor to produce the parts will be expensive. Pricing the parts based on a cost structure prevailing on much larger volume is a poor way to reflect the true wholesale economic price and it may lead to sub-optimal purchase decisions. For example, supplier representatives complained about the OEMs' reluctance to hold minor inventories of parts and their tendency to make frequent smallvolume purchases; that requires the suppliers to "turn on the machines" repeatedly to produce small, highly inefficient, quantities of parts. Schemes that accord the suppliers a greater share of the surplus might create incentives to reduce these inefficiencies.
Intellectual Property. The production of assembly parts often requires the development and application of new technologies that have high value as intellectual property beyond that particular application. Much of this technology passes over to the OEMs in the course of designing the parts and assembling them into the vehicles. The contracts grant the OEMs legal rights in these valuable information assets, not only to use them in production, but also to control other uses. Suppliers-particularly those for whom the technology is the main asset-care greatly about this type of appropriation. Here, too, there is surprising variation in the scope of rights secured by different OEMs. The most extreme position accords the OEMs unlimited rights to all intellectual property of the supplier that is disclosed in the course of trade, except for patents registered prior to the supply. 34 Suppliers also waive their trade secret protection, and assign to the OEMs all copyrightable works created under the contract without any royalty rights. These rights are often for unlimited duration, extending beyond the termination of the contract. The more restrained position of other OEMs limits the OEM's right to sublicense intellectual property and guarantees that the confidential information of the supplier will not be disclosed.
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As will be noted below, some suppliers refuse to grant such rights in their intellectual property. Companies whose main business is information technology (IT), such as the makers of software, are stubborn about this, and OEMs have learned to expect that they will not be able to dictate their terms to such suppliers. Indeed, some OEMs have specially drafted IT contracts that accommodate the expectations of their IT suppliers for more balanced terms. Still, most production parts are supplied by manufacturing companies whose main business is not IT, and these suppliers were not able to protect their investment in innovative technology as well as the IT suppliers do.
Since OEMs do not tailor their intellectual property terms specifically for each supplier, the boilerplate can be a significant source of inefficiency. Suppliers that have the ability to develop new technologies, but who cannot enjoy the full value of the technology they develop once appropriated by the OEM, will have a weaker incentive to make investments. We can only speculate that OEMs that insist on harsh IP terms end up with cars that incorporate fewer technological advances. Some of the suppliers' representatives suggested that this is the case. Tooling. The machinery and production assets used in manufacturing requires costly investments. When an OEM pays for these investments, the contract establishes that the OEM owns the tooling and permits the supplier to use the tooling to serve this OEM. The OEM contracts forbid commingling-the use of the tools for assembly of parts directed to other
OEMs. Thus, on termination, OEMs can haul away the tooling, and even charge the supplier with some of the costs of shipping.
Representatives of tier-1 suppliers voiced many complaints against the tooling provisions. A repeated complaint was that OEMs refused to allow the use of production assets to serve multiple clients. The strict ownership terms and the restriction against commingling and co-serving can lead to wasteful duplicity of investments, and, of course, to inefficiency.
Moreover, this strict control of the machines makes the OEMs' potential threat to terminate a contract (and haul away the production line) more credible. The fear that relationship-specific investments by the suppliers would be squandered increases.
What can we learn from these examples of fundamental variations in the contract terms?
We present this variation in the contracts as a puzzle; it casts some doubt over the efficient-terms hypothesis. While each OEM has its own boilerplate, there is surprisingly little borrowing from each other. Each OEM knows its competitors' forms well, but rarely copies any provision from them. In this sense, boilerplate in this industry has not risen to the level of "quasi-statute" that it achieved in other industries. 36 And while factors relating to corporate "culture" can explain the persistence of this variation and the lack of convergence, it is hard to find an efficiency explanation. Of course, contract terms do not always reflect actual practices. The actual behavior under the contract may not vary as much as the variation in contract language. There is some indication that OEMs may not enforce inefficient one-sided terms. For example, in a section titled "Supplier Frequently Asked Questions" appended to its Global Terms and Conditions, Ford explains that one of the most troubling new provisions in this form, the setoff term, was never used literally and only infrequently used at all. 37 So it is possible that the inefficiency of some terms is only on paper and that in practice the OEMs apply systematic "tailored forgiveness" of some of the harsher provisions. 38 Still, it is hard to reconcile this understanding with the angry opposition that suppliers displayed towards Ford's recent redraft and the collective effort that suppliers invested through their association to change some of the terms.
We believe that the variations in the boilerplate terms do, in some cases, reflect inefficiency. True, efficiency does not always require homogeneity. In fact, oligopolistic competition may often generate product differentiation. But OEMs' contracts are not "products"
that suppliers pick along a spatial dimension. The variation in terms does not provide any advantage of improved "matching" or increased markets. Nor does the "menu" of contracts available in the industry force suppliers to "self-select" (as in the case were only high-quality suppliers can afford to accept a harsh warranty term). The story of the boilerplate is by-and-large an account of economic power, perhaps gone astray.
We do not claim that the boilerplate terms are the cause of the inefficiency. It is more plausible that many of these provisions, as we will argue below, are tailored to leverage the OEMs' economic and bargaining power in the negotiation stage into advantages at the This rigidity of the forms is not so much a feature of interpretive or learning externality (that is, the adherence to something familiar with a predictable meaning), but rather a reflection of an OEM's belief that the terms in its form work well and serve its profit goals.
These boilerplate contracts are simple. The terms are written in plain English. Although most of the tier-1 suppliers are large corporations with sophisticated legal counsel who read every word of the OEM contracts, and although each provision in these contracts can have significant effects on the division of the surplus, the clauses are drafted in a much simpler and shorter form than ordinary consumer contracts. For example, GM's warranty provision is three sentences long. The main part says that "Seller warrants/guarantees that the goods covered by this contract will conform to the specification, drawing, samples, or description furnished to or by Buyer, and will be merchantable, of good material and workmanship and free of defect."
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The warranty paragraph adds that the goods "will be fit and sufficient for the particular purposes the indemnification provision that was in GM's purchase order. intended by the Buyer" and that the duration of the warranty will match the warranty provided by the Buyer to its customers. 42 This paragraph is strikingly different than warranty terms in, say, consumer contracts, which are usually lengthy, cumbersome, and legalistic. Perhaps this difference owes to the greater government regulation of consumer warranties; perhaps it has to do with the identity of the drafter-a buyer or seller. A seller-drafter needs to avoid the sweeping warranties of the UCC, whereas buyers like the OEMs need only to strengthen the pro-buyer UCC warranties. Note, also, that the difference between warranty terms in the auto production context and other, consumer-related, contracts cannot be explained by factors like trade usages and course of dealings. The supplier's warranty to the OEM is governed solely by the express warranty term.
Since boilerplate terms have to deal with many different types of situations and address many possible contingencies, drafting the standard form from scratch would seem a daunting task. It is often perceived, therefore, that the drafting of boilerplate language in mass contracts involves not much more than a cut-and-paste task, whereby the "drafter" identifies similar forms used by other organizations that do similar business and-on the premise that "if they work for others they'll also work for me"-borrows their language. 43 Interestingly, however, the American OEM supply contracts were not drafted in this fashion. Each OEM contract was 42.
Id. Ford's Purchase Order form is an exception, in that it is a long contract stretching over thirtyone pages. This form, which was launched in 2004 following a significant overhaul, also contains simple language, but it covers many more contingencies than other OEM contracts. Still, Ford's warranty term is almost identical to GM's, and equally short. As far as we were able to determine, there is no battle-of-the-forms maneuvering against
OEMs. 45 We could not find reference to a single legal dispute on battle of the forms with an OEM, and none of the OEM or tier-1 representatives were able to quote an example. 46 Battlesof-the-forms disputes are avoided, not by forcing the supplier to acquiesce ex post to the OEM's terms. Rather, they are prevented ex ante by the OEMs insisting at the time that bids are invited that, as a condition for bidding, the supplier must agree to be bound by the boilerplate terms of the OEM's form. Since the bidding occurs before the contract has been "issued" and at the time when the supplier's position is the weakest-at the time when its refusal to commit to the OEM's boilerplate could cost it the opportunity to bid-it is not surprising that most tier-1 suppliers agree not to engage in the battle of the forms and instead sign or otherwise agree to a form that binds them to the OEM terms. The finding that battles of the forms almost never occur is based on many conversations with attorneys in the industry. It may well be, though, that the picture portrayed by attorneys is not precise. Purchasing agents and engineering officers may have a particular interest in the deal-say because of the attractive price or the unique technology offered by the supplier-which would lead them to care little whether some "legal" terms are contested in a boilerplate letter sent by the supplier. The attorneys' score card, on the other hand, depends on their success in blocking ex post disputes and securing the most favorable boilerplate terms. It is perhaps this desire to boast and to display a successful legal record that distorts the picture we report.
company make concessions to a tier-1 supplier? In fact, this barrier is recognized by suppliers as credible and intimidating, discouraging them from demanding that some terms be negotiated.
Furthermore, any variation in the legal terms would need to be drafted by a staff attorney.
The legal offices of the OEMs simply do not have the resources to oversee frequent changes in the thousands of contracts entered into daily. This lack of legal capacity is another internal organizational hurdle, known to suppliers and deemed credible by them, that blocks any process of dickering over the legal terms.
Equality of Treatment. Another factor that limits the incidence of variation from the boilerplate terms is the strong formal commitment of OEMs to treat all their suppliers equally. Of course, transactions with suppliers vary significantly with respect to the goods purchased, prices, volume, and the like. But all suppliers-from the mega corporations who produce car frames to the sellers of nuts and bolts-must take the same legal terms: payment provisions, termination rights, warranties and remedies, and the like. OEMs believe that the fact that these terms are presented as non-negotiable and that variations are not approved provides their suppliers with assurance that there is horizontal equity, that everyone is treated the same. In fact, this equity factor is a reason why one of the OEMs recently revised its entire set of boilerplate provisions. It clarified to its suppliers that any concession negotiated by them in previous contracts would, of course, be honored for the duration of that contract (usually one year), but thereafter all terms would revert to the new set of "Global Terms and Conditions," and the old concessions would expire unless affirmatively approved by the vice president. 49 OEMs believe that suppliers recognize that more is at stake for the OEM than the individual concession. Their implicit position-"if we give one of you an accommodation, we'll have to give it to others"-works strategically to block any accommodations, in the same way that most-favored-nation clauses bolster the commitment to avoid price discounts.
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Open-Ended Provisions. The automotive industry is the typical example for a market in which contractual arrangements are long-term. This is particularly true of OEM/tier-1 relationships, where there are specific agreements to procure parts as long as the car model is produced, normally four to eight years. But relationships also extend beyond a single model, to encompass many such car-model contracts, and to cover the many years of supply of service parts. Given the difficulty of anticipating many factors that may become relevant in the course of performing the agreements, it is commonly noted that contracts signed up front must exhibit flexibility and must leave room for governance by ad hoc adjustments, agreements to agree, and informal norms. Indeed, the OEM boilerplate forms, although "tight" in many respects thing to negotiations over boilerplate, whereby uniform objections by suppliers did lead to some-albeit minor-changes in the draft. Specifically, suppliers were disgruntled over terms that allowed OEMs to impose costly changes in design, terms that permit OEMs to setoff any cost incurred in servicing a recall or a warranty against the account of the supplier of the allegedly defective part, and terms that allocate a fixed share of the liability to the suppliers. Not surprisingly, it is with respect to these issues that the OEM elected to implement open-ended terms, postponing the dickering of the actual resolution of individual cases, if the issues arise, to the post-performance stage.
The Dissemination of Boilerplate Terms Across Tiers. OEM contracts with their tier-1 suppliers affect the contracts entered into in lower tiers. Tier-1 suppliers, being strapped to the onerous OEM terms, turn around and offer the same terms to their own tier-2 suppliers. Of course, they may have less bargaining power to mandate their own terms, but at least the very large tier-1 companies-the twenty-five or so mega-corporations like Delphi and Visteon that supply a large portfolio of parts-ordinarily have enough leverage to require suppliers to use their terms. Representatives of tier-1 suppliers admitted to us that they would have much preferred to use a more balanced contract both upstream and downstream (which again suggests that the OEMs terms are inefficient-the tier-1 companies are shielded from the terms' distributive effect, and can be averse to them only because of the waste that they create). But given the OEM terms that are imposed on them in their capacity as sellers, they cannot afford to use other terms in their capacity as buyers. A striking metaphor that a tier-1 representative used is "contractual DNA." Looking at contracts down the supply chain, one can identify the OEM for which a given supply is eventually intended by the terms of the lower tier contracts. With each tier buyer copying some of the terms it had to accept as a supplier, the OEM's terms are "genetically" replicated down the chain.
The special position of tier-1 suppliers explains their ambivalence towards the otherwise concerted effort of suppliers in the automotive industry to advocate for "fairer" contracts. Some of this effort is coordinated by the suppliers' association, OESA. One of the projects of this association was the drafting of the Model General Terms and Conditions, which is a selfproclaimed "more balanced approach to buyer-seller relations" with the goal of "increas [ing] cooperation, communication, and trust between buyers and sellers." 51 Tier-1 representatives have generally been less than enthusiastic, however, in supporting this initiative. Their concern is that if such an initiative would succeed and the use of the model terms would become a standard request of suppliers, it would harm their position vis-à-vis their lower tier suppliers, without helping them much vis-à-vis the OEMs. If a tier-1 supplier has to sign a fixed-price contract with an OEM for five years, he needs a contract with a tier-2 supplier that extends for the same period of time to enable him to maintain the fixed price.
III. Economic Power
Although courts and lawyers sometimes talk about form contracts as non-negotiable and subject to no limits, we know that is not true. Some drafters pull back from the limit of their economic power, some decline to exercise the rights that their contract gives, some contracts are 
In Germany an organization called the Verband der Automobilindustrie (VDA) negotiates with the
OEMs on behalf of the suppliers. The OEM forms used in Germany are the product of this collective bargaining. If initiatives in the United States like OESA's are to succeed the way they succeed in Germany, they have to start with the OEMs; the terms will then trickle down the supply tiers. Because the OEMs do not appear willing to enter into such a bargain and because the tier-1 suppliers cannot afford to enter into a bargain with the OEMs entering into one first, we do not foresee a collective agreement in the United States among the suppliers and the OEMs of the kind that apparently exists in Germany.
invalidated by courts, and others are constrained by legislation, regulation, or by threat of litigation or legislation. In this part we examine how market power shapes the deals and the contracts, with an eye to the specific provisions in the OEMs' purchase orders that are aimed at securing their economic power.
At the outset of this study, we hypothesized that OEMs' bargaining power would be strongest at the bidding and contract formation stage and weakest once relationship-specific investments were made and performance began. We imagined that once the OEMs became dependent on a supplier, they would face instances of hold-up, where the supplier demanded better price and other terms. The standard hold-up account seems to fit this situation perfectlyin fact, the hold-up theory was developed in the context of the GM/Fisher Body saga, which was an OEM/tier-1 relation. This hypothesis turned out to be surprisingly misguided, as we will explain below. We also hypothesized that economic power would echo down the supply tiers, with tier-1 suppliers being dominated by OEMs but exercising their own dominance over tier-2 suppliers. This too turned out to be only partially true. Some powerful companies, such as Exxon and General Electric, are in the tier-2 levels and are able to wield power because of their size and product mix. Other tier-2 suppliers have power because of their wide base of clients, extending beyond the automotive industry, and can afford to pass on automotive contracts. Yet other low tier suppliers have power that is supported by the uniqueness of their technology. Finally, the financial integrity of a firm turned out to affect its economic power in ways that are more subtle than we expected.
As we mentioned above, the OEM representatives freely admitted that their forms included most terms that the drafters thought necessary or helpful to protect their clients'
interests, and that they did not feel obliged to add similar terms that their sellers might have liked. For example all of the OEM contracts (and presumably most between suppliers) give the buyer the right to terminate the contract without cause in certain circumstances and to cancel it for cause in other cases. The sellers get no corresponding rights of termination or cancellation.
This power, along with the absence of a quantity commitment on the part of the OEM, makes the contract so one-sided that it runs the risk of being unenforceable. 
A. Lower Tier Contracts
When we move down from OEM contracts to lower tiers in the supply chain, bargaining power is no longer one-sided. Tier-1 suppliers cannot exert the same influence on tier-2s as Still, we find that tier-1 suppliers have some success overcoming these weaknesses and imposing their own terms on their suppliers. Some tier-1 self-drafted contracts include terms that their own attorneys admit are more onerous than the OEM terms. For example, the tier-1 contract we saw provided that the tier-2 supplier must indemnify the buyer for 100% of the liability that the buyer bears vis-à-vis the OEM. That is, while OEM contracts either leave the issue of the division of liability for costly recalls and other defects open or impose a 50%-unless-otherwiseagreed-upon split, the tier-1 contract imposed a 100% liability on the supplier. 58 The reason, it was explained to us, is that OEMs have the ex post power, once a recall occurs, to dictate the 57. OESA, supra note 11.
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See Delphi Corp. General Terms and Conditions, supra note 24.
supplier's share, and there is not much a disgruntled supplier can do other than plead for a fair allocation. On the other hand, tier-2 suppliers can fight back and in some events litigate or seek arbitration to settle these issues. Thus, to counter the greater ex post power of tier-2s, that contract was written with a more onerous term.
Moreover, when terms are disputed by their suppliers at the negotiation stage, tier-1
companies resort to what can be labeled a "golden rule." Since pro-buyer boilerplate terms were imposed on the tier-1 by the OEMs when the tier-1s played the role of a seller, it is only fair that the tier-1 company would use symmetric terms in their roles as buyers. The argument made by tier-1s, that they cannot afford to give their sellers better terms because they cannot turn around and negotiate similar concessions as sellers to the OEMs, is often successful. It is this mechanism that causes the OEM terms to be replicated downstream.
B. Sellers' Power Due to Switching Costs
An important factor that appeared to influence the contracts among the OEMs and suppliers was the OEMs' significant switching costs. All of the OEM representatives, while recognizing that they have much of the bargaining power at the bidding stage, acknowledged that the pendulum shifts and suppliers may have some power in the course of carrying out a longterm contract. Many current contracts are for intricate sub-assemblies that will be installed wholesale into a finished automobile. For example an OEM might buy the entire heating and cooling system from a supplier, and the supplier might be the principal designer of the system.
Since any such system must integrate with the car's electrical and other systems and must conform to the physical location that is set aside for it in the completed automobile, the "part" may be unique. It is this uniqueness that accords the supplier the power.
Put differently, there are high switching costs in auto manufacturing. Switching costs are high because of the significant technological investments that other suppliers would have to expend to be able to fill the required order. For example, a tier-1 supplier may make all of the frames of a high-volume vehicle. That supplier built an assembly line to manufacture the frames and had considerable difficulty meeting the OEM's technological requirements. These same complexities of building and operating an entire assembly line would confront any new supplier if the OEM fired its current supplier. Such difficulties cannot be overcome in a short period of time.
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Switching costs are also high because of safety problems. If the supplier's work relates to the brakes, engine operation, passenger restraints or the car's suspension, defects may pose safety risks and may be an integral part of the OEM's satisfaction of governmental safety regulations. If the replacement of one supplier's part with another's would require additional safety tests to comply with governmental regulations, one can be sure that any change of suppliers would be costly and time consuming. Moreover, even without having to comply with safety regulations, switching costs may be high because of the need to integrate the component with other parts and to test its performance before assembling it into the vehicle. It is for these reasons that an OEM usually relies upon the "sole-source" supply method, under which it purchases its requirements of parts or raw materials from one supplier. Using more than one supplier-either by switching over time, or contemporaneously-would significantly increase the testing and tooling costs, lead to inconsistent quality, and undermine economies of scale.
If an OEM who abandons a supplier would suffer prohibitive costs in finding and qualifying a replacement, it may be conjectured that the original supplier has some economic Subcontracting in the Japanese Automobile Industry, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 2636 (2000) (providing an account of the Japanese auto industry and suggesting that relationship-specific investments and switching costs play less of a role than is usually assumed).
power over the OEM for the contracted goods or services for some period-perhaps even to the end of the model run of the vehicle in which the part or assembly is installed. This power, we should expect, would be at its height shortly after production commences when the supplier looks forward to five years of work, and when the competing bidders have turned to other things.
In fact, this conjecture-that a tier-1 supplier can exert hold-up power against an OEM after production begins-is widely recognized as the benchmark example in economic theory for the general problem of contractual hold-up. The standard account of the hold-up problem was developed and generically illustrated in the context of the very same OEM/tier-1 contracts that we explored. It suggests that in the 1920s Fisher Body (a tier-1 supplier of automotive bodies)
had a ten-year requirements contract with General Motors. When GM's requirements increased due to the greater demand for closed-body cars, Fisher Body enjoyed an "intolerable" position to hold up General Motors and to refuse to make adjustments that were overall efficient, and was therefore acquired and vertically integrated into GM. high switching costs, OEMs would indeed be vulnerable to rent-extraction. As one leading economist explains:
Why did GM and Fisher Body not simply write a better contract? Arguably, GM recognized that, however good a contract it wrote with Fisher Body, [. . .] contingencies might occur that no contract could allow for. GM wanted to be sure that next time around it would be in a stronger bargaining position; in particular, it would be able to insist on extra supplies, without having to pay a great deal for them.
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Our own findings suggest that, at least in the automotive business, this bargaining position/hold-up account is misguided. For one, the contracts are pretty good at dealing with this problem, as we will show below. But even without looking into the contractual language, this account ignores the fact that each individual transaction is only part of a larger portfolio of business, both concurrently and into the future. Even for unique goods, the power of the supplier to hold its buyer up is effectively limited. If the seller uses its power to engage in explicit holdup (e.g. "Give me an increase in price or I won't ship") he knows he will lose in the long run.
One OEM representative emphasized that the buyers "have long memories" and assured us that a successful threat by a seller would surely count against it in the award of new contracts. Even more threatening, the representative told us, is that a major disruption at one OEM is likely to become known to the others and to be considered by other OEMs when bids are being evaluated.
Representatives of suppliers concurred with this skeptical view. If a supplier puts a gun to the 62. Oliver Hart, Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure 7 (1995).
head of the OEM, it would be "suicide," they claim; the short-term benefit from extracting some concession will be more than offset by the long-term reputation sanction.
The myth that suppliers can engage in hold-up overlooks a very basic fact. Suppliers trying to hold up OEMs must threaten to halt production of a part that is necessary to keep the assembly line working. Such a threat, if carried out, would lead to enormous losses, constituting an entire melt down in the industry. The tier-1 supplier who commits such a hold-up would therefore be subjected to potentially bankrupting damages, some of which can be setoff by the OEM against the supplier's account as a matter of self-help. Moreover, the OEM would likely be able to get injunctive relief, 63 thus barring such a threat from being carried out in the first place.
In other words, the hold-up account assumes lethargic contractual obligation and legal enforcement, which is probably far from reality.
Moreover, in his rebuttal of the Fisher Body myth, Ronald Coase speculated that problems of supplier hold-up can be addressed by OEMs contractually. 64 We have seen some evidence for such contractual arrangements. First, OEMs have almost unconstrained authority to terminate contracts. That is, if anyone has the contractual power to threaten to walk away, it is the OEM, not the supplier. True, they may not want to terminate a contract for supply of unique parts, but they can threaten to terminate other contracts with this same supplier, to "phase out" its business. Second, OEMs maintain significant property rights in "tooling," namely in the machines and production assets at the suppliers' plants, and they can haul these assets away once the contract is terminated, often with only stingy compensation for suppliers' sunk investment.
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Thus, a supplier is in effect posting a bond against hold-up; their investment will be amortized in the course of production, but only if they stick around for the long haul. 66 Third, OEMs reserve for themselves, in other boilerplate terms, the right to control the very profitable market for service parts for years, sometimes decades, into the future, and to potentially share this profit with suppliers. Suppliers that hold up the OEM in the short run will lose in a big way in the division of the aftermarket surplus. Finally, buyers in this industry do enjoy some success in securing court injunctions against breach, 67 and can thus fend off suppliers who are holding up in order to renegotiate existing terms.
In his rebuttal of the GM-Fisher Body myth, Coase then is correct in asserting that contractual provisions can protect OEMs from hold-up. 68 But a more important aspect, we believe, and one that is also recognized by Coase, is that the "concern for their reputation would
65.
See also Miwa and Ramseyer, supra note 59, at 2642; Baird, supra note 61, at 26 (noting that the GM/Fisher hold-up account is not plausible because GM could have retained ownership of dies, which it would be able to retrieve in case Fisher engaged in hold-up).
66. This ownership-of-tooling mechanism may appear to conform in part to the Klein-CrawfordAlchian hypothesis, that the problem of hold-up is addressed through vertical integration. See supra note 1. What we found in the contracts is indeed an ownership solution, but not one that rises to complete integration. Instead, OEMs have devised a subtle scheme in which they maintain partial ownership rights in the supplier's tooling, rights that gradually diminish over the life of the contract, as the hold-up scare diminishes. The rights do not give them actual control of the organization of production, but may allow them to exclude commingling and other uses, thereby reducing the alternative value of the assets to the supplier. also have deterred the Fisher brothers from engaging in [hold-up] ." 69 The explanations we heard from all the participants confirmed that it is indeed the OEMs' long memories and the sanctions they can levy upon bad suppliers in future deals-that is, reputation sanctions-that render holdup a bad strategy for tier-1 suppliers. Any short-term gain to be had by this offensive bargaining tactic will be greatly offset by long-term losses in future deals. The "hold-up myth" fails because it is based on a false empirical assumption that suppliers specialize in a single part or assembly.
In reality, many of the suppliers-and the large ones in particular-supply hundreds of parts and assemblies to the OEMs. Their business is not to supply a part, but a portfolio of parts. Even if they have some power with respect to one part, it does not change the fact that as suppliers of portfolios whose only clients are the few OEMs, they are captives, rather than hijackers. That is, the business plan of these supply firms-large diversified companies that specialize in automotive parts-is to build a symbiotic relationship with their clients, a fabric of reliability that will be completely undermined by hold-up.
Thus, if long-term contracts confer power on the weaker seller, but if the seller cannot engage in hold-up, how is that power used? First the power ameliorates the standard contract termination or cancellation terms. If the buyer cannot find a replacement, it cannot exercise its legal right to cancel. Second, particularly with a weak supplier, the contract may mitigate an OEM's setoff or hold-back of funds earned where the OEM claims that the supplier broke the contract. If the supplier is in a weak financial state, the OEM risks losing the supplier's production if it reduces the supplier's cash flow by setoff. We suspect that the seller's power is also expressed in more subtle effects on the buyer's use of its boilerplate. For example we can imagine buyers hesitating to be as aggressive as they might be in using the boilerplate indemnity provision against an important seller. As we suggest above, a seller needs to be felicitous in its 69. Id. use of this power (e.g. "Can you give me some help with my increased material costs?") to escape identification as a chiseler who should be avoided when new contracts are awarded.
Further, since many tier-1 suppliers produce a portfolio of parts, they can leverage the power they have in the supply of one crucial component to secure additional deals for other parts.
C. Bankruptcy
The picture of a weak tier-1 supplier, squeezed by powerful OEMs that demand ever growing discounts, can change dramatically when the supplier experiences insolvency. When this happens, suppliers' threats to stop performing critical contracts become credible. They are credible because they come not from a company that is concerned with long-term business, but Ironically, at times when the supplier's costs increase unexpectedly it is that very weakness of the supplier's economic power and its inability to secure modifications to the contracts with the OEMs that can send it to bankruptcy, and eventually bolster the credibility of its threat. Threats from the weak and desperate are more powerful than threats from the strong and rational. Indeed, the increasing hardship of the American automotive industry provides ample examples of this unfortunate dynamic. 73 They confirm that tier-1 suppliers have no power to hold up the OEMs when the OEMs know that their suppliers regard the costs of long-term retribution as greater than the near term gains from improved terms. But when retribution loses its effect, hold-up can be significant. Still, suppliers generally believe that even if it is bankruptcy that drives the price renegotiation the victorious supplier will suffer significant detriments in future dealings.
73.
One prominent example is Collins and Aikman (C&A), a tier-1 supplier who entered bankruptcy in May 2005. This company, which makes parts used in 90% of American cars, many of which are irreplaceable complex assemblies manufactured in factories that are symbiotically attached to OEMs' plants, was unable to leverage the uniqueness of its products into profitable contracts. The more it grew, the more dependent it became on future contracts from the OEMs and the weaker was its economic power in the bargaining game. When C&A filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11, it threatened to stop performance unless its contracts were renegotiated and the prices increased-that is, it engaged in classic hold-up. Given its well-known cash shortage and the demands of unsecured creditors to stop performance of losing contracts, C&A had a credible threat. The payoff from the use of this power was quick: the three OEMs agreed to give C&A $82.5 million by raising the prices on their existing supply contracts with C&A by 15%, to purchase $140 million of tooling, and to make a loan of $82.5 million. See
McCracken, supra note 70.
IV. is that for IT companies, the intellectual property clauses in the contracts are critical, as this is their only asset. Standing to lose more from the OEMs' IP provisions, their resistance to these expropriatory clauses is therefore more credible.
And yet IT firms succeed not only in securing better intellectual property terms, but also far more lenient warranty and remedies provisions. We found this feature to be the most puzzling. Could it be explained by the fact that, unlike the ordinary tier-1 "assemblers," IT firms do not buy "parts" and therefore do not have many tier-2s to which they can turn around and dump similar anti-seller terms?
The prevalence of warranty and remedy limitations in the IT area can perhaps be explained by the nature of information products. It is often difficult to determine whether a defect in the operation of the integrated component is a result of bugs in the software or inadequate specification requested by the client. When a machine shuts down due to software problems, the consequential harm may be huge, and yet the fix may be simple and cheap.
Moreover, IT firms provide their services to a variety of industries and products. Similar technologies and information can be adapted to heterogeneous products and applications. Thus, it is beyond the expertise of the IT supplier to foresee the types and magnitude of the consequential harm that a defect might cause, and it is therefore hard to insure. Self-insurance by the more specialized buyer makes economic sense. As a result, suppliers of IT are unwilling to provide warranties beyond repair and replacement.
Japanese Manufacturers. Outside the area of IT contracts, we discovered that at least some of the Asian OEM's will modify some parts of their boilerplate terms. One tier-1 supplier reported that a Japanese OEM would listen to focused and well reasoned objection to particular provisions of its form contract. The tier-1 supplier emphasized that even the Japanese OEM would not agree to wholesale changes to its form, but he made clear that the Japanese attitude toward negotiation was markedly different from that of American OEMs. Another source confirmed that while Toyota and Honda have contracts with strict terms, they view their relationship with suppliers as long-term and place more value on suppliers' satisfaction. 
75.
The following anecdote illustrates the type of behavior that we denote "cultural." One of our respondents in an American tier-2 company explained how a tier-1 Japanese supplier agreed to give a price increase. The American supplier had agreed to make and sell a part to the tier-1 supplier for approximately $3.00. When the first parts were delivered they were missing one weld. The weld had been identified on the drawings in Japanese and the seller had failed to translate that part of the instructions. When the parties discovered this, the Japanese buyer agreed to add 7¢ to the price to cover the cost of the additional weld-with the admonition that the seller had better get it right the next time. The seller's representative assured us that any American OEM would have "pointed to the contract" and forced the seller to eat the cost. success is measured by how well the car works, the extent of warranty obligation it causes and, of course, how well it sells. A time honored but relatively crude way for a supplier to get better legal terms is to convince the OEM engineers that the supplier's part is the only acceptable part and to get the engineer to write the specifications to exclude others. Or one might get the engineers to agree to "engineering change orders" that modify the specification of the part, enable the supplier to quote a new price (without going through a competitive bidding process), and increase the profit on the sale of the part. These ploys that result in higher prices offset some of cost of unfavorable boilerplate.
More subtle indirect changes in the contract may also come in through the engineers or by the addition of a term that the purchasing manager does not regard as part of his "cost." For example a supplier may negotiate for a side agreement that permits the supplier to use the OEM's tooling to make aftermarket parts, a right that the boilerplate would deny. Since the supplier's profit on the aftermarket parts may be substantial, yet the purchasing manager might not regard that as part of his "price," the seller gets something of considerable value. One tier-1 representative spoke of the pricing for service parts and change in the terms of the warranty process as examples of terms in the boilerplate that the OEM's might alter by a side agreement, if a successful pitch has been made to an organ within the OEM who cares more about other factors. In these cases too, the base price stated in the contract would not change but the change would have measurable and predictable value for the supplier.
Conclusion
So there you have it-sophisticated companies use the rigid boilerplate forms to govern tens of billions of dollars of sales every year. The drafters of these forms are not the least embarrassed in admitting that they draft every term in a one-sided, self-serving manner. It turns out that such unrestrained economic power in contracting is exercised not merely against the weak and ill advised, but also against sophisticated partners to relational contracts. And yet, in numerous discussions with suppliers and their representatives, we have not heard the word "unconscionability" even once. Obviously, there is no element of duress or unfair surprise in the formation of these contracts. It is the understanding of all who are involved in this market that bargaining power is the name of the game, and that the only way to reform the contracts is to alter some fundamental features of this market, to affect the division of economic power.
Our study has obvious limitations. Since our primary interest was the boilerplate contracts, the evidence we collected came from "legal" sources-the contracts, the lawyers who draft them, the lawyers representing the parties to the purchase agreements, and the very small body of case law. In the shadow of this legal cloud there may be a different business reality in which transactions occur in a more balanced way, where OEMs exercise their power and their contractual entitlements in a selective and less selfish manner. While we cannot rule out such a possibility, it does not seem plausible. Representatives of suppliers with whom we spoke exhibited too much frustration with the OEMs' legal terms; they appear to believe that the reality of the business is consistent with the picture portrayed by the boilerplate.
What are the lessons that can be drawn from this study? Unlike some prior studies of automotive contracts, we do not claim any general conclusions about contractual behavior, nor do we aim any critique at the law or advocate any legal reform. The automotive production business is sufficiently idiosyncratic that much of what we have learned may be applicable only to this industry. For one, it is clear that much of the bargaining power account stems from the specific structure of the industry, in which specialized tier-1 companies are "captives"-they have immense investments in production capacity and can sell only to a handful of clients. But this study does show patterns that may have broader application. It identifies the important role that internal organization structures play in the formation of form contracts. A story we all heard many times is that organizational concerns can explain the necessity of standard forms. That is, forms are a way for principals to exert control over terms offered by their agents. But what we found here was the flip side of this account. The internal hierarchy is not the reason for the forms, but rather an instrument in implementing the forms as-is, without allowing any erosion of the terms. Constantly under pressure by counterparties to vary some terms, buyers have erected artificial internal structures to prevent purchasing agents from yielding to such pressures. This internal rigidity also explains the absence of "menus"-the refusal of the drafting party to set prices under which its counterparties can "buy" better terms.
While some of our findings can be explained with clear economic logic, for others we did not find a compelling explanation. We do not offer a satisfactory explanation for the variance of terms across the different OEM contracts, or for the conjecture that some terms are inefficient. If we are right in suggesting that there is inefficiency in the legal provisions, it is possible-given the enormous stakes in this industry-that a lot of money is left on the table. Clearly, the OEMs are using any means to reduce costs and are pressuring their suppliers to the maximum extent.
But by using such harsh terms, the OEMs may be creating (or at least, not eliminating) the deadweight loss. Another finding that left us puzzled is the IT forms; these are a remarkable exception to the otherwise one-sided boilerplate in the industry. We can offer only guesses as to why IT firms succeed in securing better terms. We leave this question for future inquiry.
Finally, this study reinforces some doubts about theories of asymmetric information in contracting. We mentioned that a prominent line of thought in economic theory identifies contractual "failures" as the reason for why firms organize the way they do, and why some activities are outsourced and others are done in-house. Since auto production contracts have served an important role in demonstrating these insights (the GM/Fisher Body story), we took a closer look at the actual contracts. We discovered a reality in which more things are "contractible" than previously suggested; where asymmetric information and imperfect verification are rarely obstacles for contracting; and where reputation sanctions quickly fill any void that the contracts may have left. And yet, the familiar economic story of vertical integration is not necessarily undermined. While it is not manifested through outright takeover of supplier firms, we discovered that integration in production occurs in more subtle ways, such as contingent control over production assets and technological innovations.
